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Experienced regularities in our perceptions and actions play important roles in grounding
abstract concepts such as social status, time, and emotion. Might we similarly ground
abstract spatial concepts in more experienced-based domains? The present experiment
explores this possibility by implicitly priming abstract spatial terms (north, south, east,
west) and then measuring participants’ hand movement trajectories while they respond
to a body-referenced spatial target (up, down, left, right) in a verbal (Exp. 1) or spatial
(Exp. 2) format. Results from two experiments demonstrate temporally dynamic and prime
biased movement trajectories when the primes are incongruent with the targets (e.g.,
north – left, west – up). That is, priming abstract coordinate directions influences subse-
quent actions in response to concrete target directions. These findings provide the first
evidence that abstract concepts of world-centered coordinate axes are implicitly under-
stood in the context of concrete body-referenced axes; critically, this abstract-concrete
relationship manifests in motor movements, and may have implications for spatial memory
organization.
Keywords: spatial cognition, embodied cognition, masked priming, mouse tracking, abstract concepts
INTRODUCTION
Spatial thinking is a fundamental part of our daily routines; we rely
on spatial memory to navigate around our homes and to work,
and we constantly acquire novel spatial experiences as we move
through our environment. Traditional theories largely assume that
our mental representations of space are tightly bound to specific
experiences. For instance we can mentally represent ground-level
views after navigating on foot, and we remember environmental
structure after viewing a map (Tolman, 1948; Mou and McNa-
mara, 2002; Jeffery and Burgess, 2006). More recent work, however,
has demonstrated that memories of environments are flexible,
malleable, and highly vulnerable to factors both internal (e.g.,
experience level, goals, handedness, spatial skills, preferences, and
heuristics) and external (e.g., environment complexity and den-
sity) to an individual (i.e., Taylor et al., 1999; Waller, 2000; Hegarty
et al., 2006; Brunyé and Taylor, 2009; Gyselinck et al., 2009; Brunyé
et al., 2010a, 2012b). In this context, memories for environments
experienced from a first-person (i.e., egocentric) perspective may
also integrate allocentric spatial knowledge that is more abstract
in nature, relying on fixed, self-removed coordinate terms.
It is unclear how exactly people might represent such abstract
world-centered reference systems in spatial memory. A grow-
ing body of research suggests that understanding abstract con-
cepts involves making connections to experience-based domains
(Boroditsky and Prinz, 2008). For instance, people rely upon
the concrete horizontal spatial axis when thinking about time
(Boroditsky and Ramscar, 2002), the vertical spatial axis when
thinking about social status (Piaget, 1927/1969; Tversky et al.,
1991; Casasanto and Lozano, 2006; Gagnon et al., 2011), and both
horizontal and vertical spatial axes when thinking about affective
valence (Meier and Robinson, 2004; Casasanto and Chrysikou,
2011). In each of these cases, people appear to use concrete per-
ceptual, sensory, and interoceptive experiences with the world to
structure abstract thought.
The notion that people integrate bodily experiences into mental
representations is foundational to theories of embodied cognition
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Barsalou, 2008). Strong behavioral
and neural evidence exists in favor of these theories; for instance,
reading about an object primes the actions typically performed
upon the object (Borghi et al., 2004), and reading action-related
words biases subsequent hand movements (Glenberg and Kaschak,
2002; Richardson et al., 2003) and spontaneously activates motor-
ically relevant areas of the pre-motor cortex (Kemmerer et al.,
2008). Recent work further suggests that processing abstract lan-
guage engages perceptual and action-based representations; for
instance, abstract indications of movement direction (e.g., delegat-
ing a responsibility) facilitate subsequent movements of the hand
in that direction (e.g., away from self; Glenberg et al., 2008b). The
present study asks whether people might similarly use these types
of experience-based representations to aid in conceptualizing
abstract spatial concepts.
In contrast to abstract, intangible notions (e.g., time, future,
power), people can directly perceive and act upon concrete space
(e.g., metric distance, a mountain). As such, our interactions with
the environment seem directly amenable to spatial representations
that integrate perception and action. Indeed some recent work
suggests that this is the case (Brunyé et al., 2010b; Wang et al.,
2012). However, we also know that space can be thought about by
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using abstract concepts of world-centered reference systems, such
as seen with canonical coordinate space (north, south, east, west).
Even though people cannot directly perceive these directions, they
can monitor them during navigation (Mark, 1989), and use them
to shape mental representations of space (Tversky, 1993; Dabbs
et al., 1998; Golledge,1999). The coordinate terms north, south, east
and west are completely abstracted from a body-referenced system
and cannot be directly perceived in concrete space. In contrast,
people can directly perceive concrete body-referenced directions
along the x, y, and z planes; for instance, to the left or right along
the mediolateral axis, and up or down relative to the dorsoventral
axis. In spite of these differences, both abstract and concrete spatial
concepts have been implicated in guiding and constraining spatial
thought. Indeed, body-referenced directions are foundational to
spatial language and communication, navigation, and the men-
tal representation of large-scale space (Taylor and Tversky, 1996;
Mou et al., 2004; Feist and Gentner, 2007). And even though peo-
ple cannot directly perceive abstract coordinate directions, they
can monitor them during navigation (Mark, 1989), and use them
to shape mental representations of space (Tversky, 1993; Dabbs
et al., 1998; Golledge, 1999).
The use of abstract spatial coordinate terms is critical for the
transition from purely egocentric knowledge to the construction of
allocentric representations (Hart and Moore, 1973). The ability to
structure first-person experience using a fixed (i.e., self-abstracted)
reference frame tends to develop between the ages of 5 and 11 (Her-
man and Siegel, 1978), and it is a difficult task, influenced by both
spatial abilities and gender. For instance, those with generally high
spatial abilities rely more upon coordinates during navigation; in
contrast, those with lower spatial abilities rely more upon local
landmarks and often find it difficult to use abstract spatial coordi-
nate concepts when thinking about environments (for a review, see
Wolbers and Hegarty, 2010). However, coding abstract coordinate
directions in concrete space may provide a framework through
which abstract spatial understanding can more easily manifest.
In other words, binding self-relevant spatial references (e.g., to
the left ) to inherently self-abstracted coordinate directions (e.g.,
west ) might facilitate transitions from egocentric to allocentric
representational forms.
Along these lines, recent research has identified several peculiar
tendencies when people attend to the north and south directions,
which suggest that these coordinate directions are linked with
some form of concrete space. For instance, people implicitly asso-
ciate the north versus south with higher topography (Brunyé et al.,
in press) and social status (Gagnon et al., 2011). Further, there is
consistent evidence, on both regional and international levels, that
route planners tend to avoid routes that go initially northward
versus southward, perhaps with the intention of avoiding more
difficult locomotion (Brunyé et al., 2010a, 2012a). While the exact
source of these effects remains unknown, it appears that people
associate abstract concepts of coordinate space with concrete spa-
tial axes. More specifically, people conceptualize north as up and
south as down along the concrete vertical dimension (a concept
first proposed, but not tested, by Shepard and Hurwitz, 1984). This
association likely stems from the conventional orientation of north
as up on maps; consistently viewing maps in this way may result
in associating north with up, south as down, and east and west
as right and left, respectively, relative to the self (see Brown and
Levinson, 1993 for alternative hypotheses that might be applied
to Tzeltal speakers). Grounding abstract concepts of coordinate
space might allow people to transfer knowledge from experiential
spatial domains in an effort to understand an otherwise intangible
concept.
To test this possible association, we conducted two experiments
using a masked priming paradigm designed to implicitly activate
semantic concepts without conscious awareness, by measuring the
effects of prime type (i.e., abstract coordinate terms) on dynamic
motor responses to concrete target directions (i.e., concrete spatial
terms or arrows). To track motor responses, we tracked mouse
movements toward target directions using the freely availably
Mouse Tracker software (Freeman and Ambady, 2010). Mouse
Tracker records real time x and y mouse coordinates at an approx-
imate 60–75 Hz sampling rate. Tracking mouse trajectories allows
for examining the continuous temporal (i.e., when) and spatial
(i.e., in which direction) dynamics of the comprehension process
as it unfolds (Spivey et al., 2005; Dale et al., 2007). Tracking the
kinematics of a response can be used to assess movement dynamics
that hold potential for exposing cognitive operations that would
otherwise be unexposed using traditional behavioral measures
(cf., Abrams and Balota, 1991; Balota and Abrams, 1995; Spivey
and Dale, 2004, 2006; Magnuson, 2005). Directly related to the
present topic, work using mouse tracking demonstrates its util-
ity in indexing the influence of metaphor processing on motor
actions: when participants processed information regarding the
past or future, their mouse movements were drawn toward the left
or right, respectively (Miles et al., 2010a,b). Likewise this type of
online measure may provide unique insights into the spatial and
temporal nature of abstract-concrete spatial concept interactions.
The present work extends the current literature by examin-
ing three characteristics of the apparent link between abstract
coordinate space and concrete vertical space. First, whereas prior
research has identified an apparent link between north/south and
up/down (Brunyé et al., 2010a, 2012a, in press), we propose that
people may similarly represent east and west as to the right and
left (respectively) with respect to the egocentric left-right axis.
Second, we propose that these associations between abstract and
concrete spatial concepts will alter movement trajectories when
people are primed with abstract concepts and attempt to make
hand movements that are either congruent or incongruent with
the primed direction. Finally, we examine the temporal dynamics
of any effects of abstract concept activation on motor movements.
Our first experiment examined these issues by combining verbal
primes (e.g., NORTH) with verbal targets (e.g., UP), and our sec-
ond experiment tested whether our results would maintain with
non-verbal targets (i.e., directional arrows) in an effort to rule
out the possibility that lexical associations alone between primes
and targets were driving our effects. Together, we provide the
first demonstration that abstract spatial concept understanding
is grounded in the perceptual motor system.
EXPERIMENT 1
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
One hundred Tufts University undergraduate students par-
ticipated for monetary compensation. Informed consent was
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obtained from all participants in accordance with the Tufts Univer-
sity Institutional Review Board. All self-reported as right handed
(using the Edinburg Handedness Inventory; Oldfield, 1971) and
native English speaking. Given earlier work demonstrating that
approximately 25–45% of participants report being prime-aware
at similar prime durations (i.e., seeing a 43–45 ms prime; Bodner
and Masson, 2003; Bodner and Dypvik, 2005), during debrief-
ing we explicitly asked participants whether this was the case;
33 participants reported noticing at least one directional prime.
Data from these prime-aware participants (M age= 19.2; 13 male,
20 female) were removed, leaving 67 valid data sets for analysis
(M age= 19.9; 25 male,42 female). Note that whereas shorter prime
durations may reduce the number of prime-aware participants,
they may not consistently achieve a semantic level of analysis (e.g.,
25–40 ms; Holcomb et al., 2005; Klauer et al., 2007).
We used a masked priming procedure with a 4 (Prime Type:
North, South, East, West, Center, Non-word)× 4 (Target Direc-
tion: Up, Down, Right, Left) within-participants design. Masked
priming involves presenting words for such a brief duration that
they activate cognitive processes without conscious awareness
(Marcel, 1983; Cheesman and Merikle, 1984). In most cases, masks
are used to flank (both prior to and after) the presentation of
a prime with nonsense letter strings intended to minimize the
chance that participants notice the presence of a prime or dis-
criminate it from the nonsense letters (Dehaene et al., 1998; Lee
et al., 1999). In the current study, we chose a masked priming
manipulation to reduce the task demands characteristic of stud-
ies examining perceptuo-motor traces in memory; the greater
the awareness of overlap between cueing and target stimuli, the
more difficult it becomes to show strong evidence for sponta-
neous perceptuo-motor involvement in guiding human behavior
(cf., Machery, 2007; Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; van Dantzig
et al., 2008; Ditman et al., 2010).
We recorded mouse initiation times, response times, and move-
ment trajectories over time using the freely available Mouse Tracker
software (Freeman and Ambady, 2010).
MATERIALS
Primes and targets
We used six prime types corresponding to: the four coordinate
prime directions (NORTH, SOUTH, EAST, WEST), one central
control (CENTER), and a non-word control. A total of 36 non-
word controls were generated using the ARC Non-word Database1,
with each non-word ranging from 5 to 12 characters. A total of
100 forward and backward masks were generated using a Ran-
dom Letter Sequence Generator2, with each sequence consisting
of 12 letters (e.g., RVmoFcZNaDDu). Four target words were used
(UP, DOWN, RIGHT, LEFT), referring to each of the four target
locations.
Target array configuration
Using the Mouse Tracker software, we created an array of four
black rectangular target boxes arranged along the horizontal and
vertical axes on a 22′′ LCD monitor running at 1920× 1200 reso-
lution with a 70 Hz refresh rate (see Figure 1). At center, a START
1http://www.maccs.mq.edu.au/∼nwdb/nwdb.html
2http://www.dave-reed.com/Nifty/randSeq.html
button was located in a gray rectangle. Each rectangular target was
sized at approximately 15% of the corresponding monitor dimen-
sion (i.e., 290 w× 170 h pixels), and centered at a location 475
pixels from the START button. In standardized coordinate space
(see Data Scoring ), targets are centered at positions correspond-
ing to −0.6 and 0.6 along the x-axis, and 0.15 and 1.35 along the
y-axis.
PROCEDURE
Participants were instructed to “move the mouse as quickly as
possible to the box that correctly corresponds with the word pre-
sented on the screen.” In a brief practice session, each participant
was exposed to a series of 24 trials consisting of masked non-word
primes, with six trials for each of the target rectangle locations
(UP, DOWN, RIGHT, LEFT). At the beginning of each trial, the
START button appeared at screen center. Upon left-clicking on
the button with the mouse, the mouse cursor disappeared and
the forward mask was presented for 71 ms, the prime for 43 ms,
the backward mask for 71 ms, and then finally the target word
(see Figure 1). The prime duration was selected based on work
by Dehaene et al. (1998), which indicated that a 43 ms masked
prime activated a semantic level of analysis as evidenced by both
electrical brain activity (via event-related potentials) and hemo-
dynamic response (via functional magnetic resonance imaging);
specifically, Dehaene and colleagues found evidence that brain
activation in response to masked word priming is not restricted to
brain areas involved in sensory processing, but rather activated a
range of brain mechanisms involved in perception, semantic cat-
egorization, and motor task preparation. Given these results, we
expected that a 43 ms masked prime duration would be sufficient
to activate semantic meaning of our coordinate primes (NORTH,
SOUTH, EAST,WEST) without participants’conscious awareness.
Once the target word was presented, the mouse cursor became
visible and active and was centered on the START box; the partic-
ipant then moved the mouse cursor to the target box and clicked
the left mouse button. Participants always responded using their
dominant (right) hand with a conventional two-button (plus scroll
wheel) optical computer mouse positioned flat on the table ahead
of and slightly to the right of the computer monitor. Following
Freeman and Ambady (2010), participants were instructed if they
either did not begin moving the mouse cursor within the first sec-
ond it appeared after the target word was presented (“Please start
moving earlier on, even if you are not fully certain of a response
yet” was displayed at the end of the trial), if they did not respond
within 4 s (“Over time!” was presented in red at the center of the
screen and the trial was ended), or if an incorrect response was
made an X appeared in red at the center of the screen.
Following practice, participants began the main experiment.
Participants were presented with 204 trials consisting of 132 direc-
tionally primed trials (33 each of NORTH, SOUTH, EAST,WEST),
36 trials using the CENTER prime, and 36 trials using the control
non-word prime. Each set of trials was divided amongst the four
target directions (UP, DOWN, RIGHT, LEFT), and the 204 trials
were presented in random order.
RESULTS
DATA SCORING
The Mouse Tracker software samples x and y mouse cursor posi-
tion every 13–16 ms from the point the mouse becomes active
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FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1 trial sequence of example congruent and incongruent (90˚) trial types. Note that font sizes of masks, primes, and targets are
increased for figure legibility.
(target word presentation) to the response click. Incorrect trials
are removed from further analysis, and all data undergo outlier
trimming at 2.5 SD. Raw data from correct trials are rescaled to
standardized coordinate space (y-axis range 0–1.5, x-axis range−1
to 1) and normalized over time using a linear interpolation process
that results in 101 time steps (for more on this process, see: Spivey
et al., 2005; Dale et al., 2007; Freeman et al., 2008, 2010; Freeman
and Ambady, 2009, 2010). For each participant, we then averaged
normalized data for each trial comprising each of our conditions.
Prior studies using mouse tracking have used several measures
to quantify the differences in mouse trajectories relative to both
optimal (vector-based) trajectories and across experimental con-
ditions. These measures commonly include movement initiation
time, movement duration, maximum deviation (MD), and area
under the curve (AUC). Movement initiation time is the time (in
ms) from the mouse becoming active to the participant beginning
to move the mouse. Movement duration is the time (in ms) from
the participant beginning mouse movement to clicking in the tar-
get region. MD is the peak amplitude of the movement trajectory
relative to the optimal trajectory, and AUC is the area between the
movement trajectory relative to the optimal trajectory. In general,
MD and AUC are highly correlated and do not lead to different
results (Freeman et al., 2008). In the present work, we analyze
movement initiation time, movement duration, and to maintain
compatibility with the extant literature we report MD (Freeman
and Ambady, 2009; Miles et al., 2010a; Martens et al., 2012).
Thus, for each target direction (up, down, right, left) we
plotted averaged and normalized mouse trajectories over time
corresponding to each Prime Type.
ANALYSES
We plotted data and conducted repeated-measures analyses of
variance (ANOVAs) separately for each target direction (up, down,
left, right). Movement duration data, along with statistical test
results, are detailed in Table 1. Spatially and temporally normal-
ized data are depicted in Figures 2 and 3 for each Prime Type.
Finally, we provide MD data, along with statistical test results,
also in Table 1. Note that follow-up analyses showed no main or
interactive effects of participant gender (all p’s> 0.32).
UP TARGET
Up target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F< 1, p= 0.75; Figure 2A).
An ANOVA on movement duration times showed a mar-
ginal effect of Prime Type, F(5, 330)= 2.02, p= 0.07, η2= 0.03,
with shortest movement durations following a North prime, and
longest movement durations following an East or West prime.
See Table 1 for results from paired tests comparing the North
(congruent) to each of the five other primes.
Up target movement trajectory data
We calculated MD, or the peak amplitude of each movement tra-
jectory relative to the optimal trajectory (vector from start to
target); note that downward and leftward deviations are negative-
going. These data were entered into an ANOVA, which revealed
a marginal effect of Prime Type, F(5, 330)= 2.53, p< 0.05,
η2= 0.04. As depicted in Figure 2A and detailed in Table 1, there
was higher MD in the East prime condition relative to any other
condition, and lower MD in the West prime condition relative to
any other condition. In other words, the East prime biased Up
target movement trajectories to the right, and West primes biased
movement to the left.
DOWN TARGET
Down target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F< 1, p= 0.99; Figure 2B).
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Table 1 | Experiment 1 mean and standard error movement duration and maximum deviation (MD) data for each of the six prime types and four
target types.
Prime type TargetType
Up Down Right Left
M SE M SE M SE M SE
MOVEMENT DURATION
North 704.3 18.8 772.3** 16.6 695.1* 14.8 696.9 15.6
South 728.6m 19.1 729.8 18.3 695.9** 14.1 707.8* 15.3
East 742.9* 14.5 763.9m 16.0 651.5 17.4 679.3 14.8
West 747.1* 16.5 779.1** 15.1 681.7m 13.1 669.9 14.4
Non-word 727.1 16.4 757.4m 17.4 669.8 14.1 693.2m 14.4
Center 723.4 16.6 738.8 16.4 688.2* 14.2 687.6 13.9
MAXIMUM DEVIATION (MD)
North 0.0003 0.005 0.016 0.008 0.007** 0.007 0.013* 0.004
South −0.004 0.007 0.002 0.007 −0.022* 0.005 −0.017m 0.006
East 0.014** 0.004 0.022* 0.007 −0.008 0.005 −0.006 0.005
West −0.011m 0.006 −0.012* 0.007 −0.011 0.004 −0.003 0.005
Non-word 0.0008 0.006 0.004 0.007 −0.011 0.005 −0.009 0.005
Center −0.001 0.006 0.003 0.007 −0.009 0.005 0.0006 0.005
For each target type, we provide results from paired t-test comparing the congruent prime (e.g., north prime, up target; presented in bold print) versus each of the
other 5 prime types (**p< 0.01, *p<0.05, mp<0.10).
FIGURE 2 | (A,B) Experiment 1 plotted movement trajectory data for the Up (A) and Down (B) target locations, for each of the six Prime Types.
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FIGURE 3 | (A,B) Experiment 1 plotted movement trajectory data for the Left (A) and Right (B) target locations, for each of the six Prime Types.
An ANOVA on movement duration times showed an effect of
Prime Type, F(5, 330)= 3.39, p< 0.01, η2= 0.05, with shortest
movement durations following a South prime, and longest move-
ment durations following an East or West prime. See Table 1 for
results from paired tests comparing the South (congruent) to each
of the five other primes.
Down target movement trajectory data
An ANOVA on MD data revealed a main effect of Prime Type,
F(5, 330)= 3.85, p< 0.01, η2= 0.05. As depicted in Figure 2B
and detailed in Table 1, there was higher MD in the East prime
condition relative to any other condition, and lower MD in the
West prime condition relative to any other condition. In other
words, as also seen in the Up target condition, the East prime
biased movement trajectories to the right, and West biased them
to the left.
LEFT TARGET
Left target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F< 1, p= 0.71; Figure 3A).
An ANOVA on movement duration times trended toward an
effect of Prime Type, F(5, 330)= 1.5, p= 0.19, η2= 0.02, but did
not reach significance. Numerically, there were shortest movement
durations following a West prime, and longest movement dura-
tions following a North or South prime. See Table 1 for results
from paired tests comparing the West (congruent) to each of the
five other primes.
Left target movement trajectory data
An ANOVA on MD data revealed a main effect of Prime Type,
F(5, 330)= 4.19, p< 0.01, η2= 0.06. As depicted in Figure 3A
and detailed in Table 1, the highest MD occurred in the North
prime condition, and lowest MD in the South prime condition.
In other words, the North prime biased movement trajectories
upward, and South biased them downward.
RIGHT TARGET
Right target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F< 1, p= 0.82; Figure 3B).
An ANOVA on movement duration times showed an effect of
Prime Type, F(5, 330)= 2.91, p< 0.05, η2= 0.04, with shortest
movement durations following an East prime, and longest move-
ment durations following a North or South prime. See Table 1 for
results from paired tests comparing the East (congruent) to each
of the five other primes.
Right target movement trajectory data
An ANOVA on MD data revealed a main effect of Prime Type,
F(5, 330)= 3.66, p< 0.01, η2= 0.05. As depicted in Figure 3B
and detailed in Table 1, the highest MD occurred in the North
prime condition, and lowest MD in the South prime condition.
In other words, the North prime biased movement trajectories
upward, and South biased them downward.
EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION
Results demonstrate dynamic and directionally specific effects of
abstract primes on movement trajectories toward concrete tar-
get directions. However, it is unclear whether these effects are
restricted to conditions of using linguistic primes and targets; in
other words, might low-level lexical associations between primes
and targets (e.g., NORTH→ UP) be responsible for the present
effects? We conducted a control experiment to test this possibility.
CONTROL EXPERIMENT
In this study,we replaced target words (UP,DOWN,LEFT,RIGHT)
with arrows that pointed toward one of the four target directions.
If our results are due to a metaphorical mapping between primed
abstract coordinate directions and concrete target directions, and
this effect exists above and beyond any simple lexical associations,
then results should indicate similar movement trajectory biases to
those found in Experiment 1.
PARTICIPANTS AND DESIGN
Fifty-nine Tufts University undergraduate students participated
for monetary compensation, all right handed and native Eng-
lish speaking. Data from 9 prime-aware participants (M age= 20.4;
three male, six female) were removed from further analysis, leaving
50 valid data sets for analysis (M age= 21.5; 15 male, 35 female).
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FIGURE 4 | Experiment 2 trial sequence of example congruent and incongruent (90˚) trial types. Note that font sizes of masks and primes, and drawn size
of arrow, are increased for figure legibility.
The design matched that used in Experiment 1, with the 4
(Prime Type: North, South, East, West, Center, Non-word)× 4
(Target Direction: Up, Down, Right, Left) within-participants
design.
MATERIALS AND PROCEDURE
All materials and procedures matched those of Experiment 1, with
one exception: Rather than using target words, we used arrows that
pointed in the direction of each of the four target locations (see
Figure 4). Arrows were consistently sized (112 w× 57 h pixels)
and rotated 90˚ to correspond to each of the four directions (UP,
DOWN, LEFT, RIGHT).
RESULTS
DATA SCORING AND ANALYSES
All data scoring and analyses matched those used in Experiment
1. As before, follow-up analyses showed no main or interactive
effects of participant gender (all p’s> 0.27).
UP TARGET
Up target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F= 1.7, p= 0.13; Figure 5A).
An ANOVA on movement duration times showed a mar-
ginal effect of Prime Type, F(5, 245)= 1.96, p= 0.09, η2= 0.02,
with shortest movement durations following a North prime, and
longest movement durations following an East or West prime.
See Table 2 for results from paired tests comparing the North
(congruent) to each of the five other primes.
Up target movement trajectory data
Maximum deviation data were entered into an ANOVA, which
revealed a main effect of Prime Type, F(5, 245)= 2.34, p< 0.05,
η2= 0.05. As depicted in Figure 5A and detailed in Table 2, there
was highest MD in the East prime condition and lowest MD in
the West prime condition. In other words, the East prime biased
Up target movement trajectories generally to the right, and West
primes biased movement generally to the left.
DOWN TARGET
Down target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F< 1, p= 0.95; Figure 5B).
An ANOVA on movement duration times showed a marginal
effect of Prime Type, F(5, 245)= 1.84, p= 0.10, η2= 0.04, with
shortest movement durations following a South, North or Cen-
ter prime, and longest movement durations following an East or
West prime. See Table 2 for results from paired tests comparing
the South (congruent) to each of the five other primes.
Down target movement trajectory data
An ANOVA on MD data revealed a main effect of Prime Type,
F(5, 245)= 2.71, p< 0.05, η2= 0.05. As depicted in Figure 5B
and detailed in Table 2, there was highest MD in the East prime
condition and lowest MD in the West prime condition. In other
words, as also seen in the Up target condition, the East prime biased
movement trajectories generally to the right, and West biased them
generally to the left.
LEFT TARGET
Left target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F< 1, p= 0.83; Figure 6A).
An ANOVA on movement duration times revealed a marginal
effect of Prime Type, F(5, 245)= 2.01, p= 0.08, η2= 0.04, with
longest movement durations following a North or South prime.
See Table 2 for results from paired tests comparing the West
(congruent) to each of the five other primes.
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FIGURE 5 | (A,B) Experiment 2 plotted movement trajectory data for the Up (A) and Down (B) target locations, for each of the six Prime Types.
Table 2 | Experiment 2 mean and standard error movement duration and maximum deviation (MD) data for each of the six prime types and four
target types.
Prime type Target type
Up Down Right Left
M SE M SE M SE M SE
MOVEMENT DURATION
North 1097.2 14.9 1113.2 15.9 1047.3* 15.2 1078.2 21.4
South 1114.4 15.6 1121.1 18.9 1053.7m 16.7 1080.3m 18.1
East 1127.4* 14.4 1147.8 16.9 1017.2 17.8 1051.9 19.2
West 1133.3* 19 1150.8m 16.7 1010.6 15.4 1057.8 19.6
Non-word 1102.2 16.9 1128.1 16.3 1020.4 17.5 1048.5 16.9
center 1102.7 14.7 1118.2 17.9 1011.8 18 1037.4 16.7
MAXIMUM DEVIATION (MD)
North −0.006 0.006 0.013 0.008 −0.005 0.004 0.001* 0.005
South 0.001 0.008 0.004 0.009 −0.024** 0.004 −0.022m 0.004
East 0.01** 0.007 0.024* 0.024 −0.016 0.004 −0.006 0.006
West −0.016 0.007 −0.009m 0.008 −0.011 0.004 −0.012 0.006
Non−word −0.007 0.008 0.009 0.007 −0.016 0.005 −0.012 0.004
Center 0.003 0.006 0.016 0.007 −0.013 0.004 −0.005 0.005
Bold text indicates prime-target congruence. Superscript text indicates statistical significance: mp<0.10, *p<0.05, **p<0.01.
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FIGURE 6 | (A,B) Experiment 2 plotted movement trajectory data for the Left (A) and Right (B) target locations, for each of the six Prime Types.
Left target movement trajectory data
An ANOVA on MD data revealed a main effect of Prime Type,
F(5, 245)= 2.75, p< 0.05, η2= 0.05. As depicted in Figure 6A
and detailed in Table 2, the highest MD occurred in the North
prime condition and lowest MD in the South prime condition.
In other words, the North prime biased movement trajectories
generally upward, and South biased them generally downward.
RIGHT TARGET
Right target mouse initiation time and movement duration
An ANOVA on mouse initiation times showed no effect of Prime
Type (F= 1.6, p= 0.16; Figure 6B).
An ANOVA on movement duration times showed an effect of
Prime Type, F(5, 245)= 2.83, p< 0.05, η2= 0.05, with longest
movement durations following a North or South prime. See
Table 2 for results from paired tests comparing the East (con-
gruent) to each of the five other primes.
Right target movement trajectory data
An ANOVA on MD data revealed a main effect of Prime Type,
F(5, 245)= 3.01, p= 0.01,η2= 0.06. As depicted in Figure 6B and
detailed in Table 2, the highest MD occurred in the North prime
condition and lowest MD occurred in the South prime condition.
In other words, the North prime biased movement trajectories
generally upward, and South biased them generally downward.
DISCUSSION
When implicitly primed with abstract coordinate directions
(north, south, east, west), participants revealed several biases
toward the prime-congruent spatial directions when making
seemingly simple mouse movements toward target locations.
Specifically, mouse trajectories showed consistent and statistically
robust movement biases that demonstrate an attraction toward
primed abstract directions. When participants were tasked with
making movements to the right or left, priming with the abstract
spatial terms “north” or “south” biased trajectories upward and
downward, respectively. Similarly, when moving up or down,
priming with the abstract spatial terms “east” or “west” biased
trajectories rightward and leftward, respectively. Experiment 2
demonstrated that these effects exist above and beyond any influ-
ence of relatively low-level lexical associations between primed
and target words. Together, these results provide the first evidence
that people ground abstract spatial concepts in perceptuo-motor
systems. This grounding mechanism is evidenced through biased
movement trajectories that occur even when abstract concepts are
activated outside of participants’ awareness.
These results are consistent with research demonstrating that
abstract concepts are frequently understood through metaphor-
ical mappings to concrete experienced space (Barsalou, 1999;
Boroditsky and Prinz, 2008; Miles et al., 2010a; Gagnon et al.,
2011). Presently, it seems that people associate abstract spatial
concepts with concrete spatial experience, and these associations
are grounded in body-referenced axes. These body-referenced axes
extend left-right along the mediolateral axis, and up-down along
the vertical axis.
The associations between abstract and concrete space likely
arise through simple correlational learning (Hebb, 1949); daily
experiences viewing maps, atlases, and even navigation devices
consistently associate north with the upward direction (and south
with down). These experiences give rise to associations between
east and right, and west and left that seem to exist even outside
of participants’ awareness. Indeed, free-association norms (Nel-
son et al., 1998) show very weak associations between abstract
and concrete spatial terms, and implicit (but not explicit) asso-
ciations between north and upward space predict route plan-
ning biases toward the south (Brunyé et al., in press). We also
note, however, that mouse tracking is limited with regard to
determining whether north and south are represented along
the forward-backward (anteroposterior) versus up/down body
axes; moving the mouse forward/backward results in transla-
tional movement on the computer monitor along the up/down
axis. Thus, there is some conflict between the motoric and
perceptual representations of mouse movement along the y-
axis. Though we have not tested between these axes, we expect
that grounding abstract spatial concepts occurs along both for-
ward/backward and up/down body-referenced axes; indeed some
early work suggests that people may associate north with the
forward egocentric direction (Shepard and Hurwitz, 1984), and
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our own work suggests associations between north and ver-
tical perceived space (e.g., spatial topography; Gagnon et al.,
2011).
The ability to track the online dynamics of mouse movement
trajectories shows promise in revealing otherwise hidden cogni-
tive operations (Spivey and Dale, 2006; Miles et al., 2010a). In
the current study, response time patterns did not reveal consistent
evidence for priming effects; for example, response times for mov-
ing the mouse to the left were not significantly affected by any
prime type. Only when examining movement dynamics were we
able to identify consistent evidence that abstract spatial concepts
may be grounded in concrete representations of body-referenced
space. Thus, relying exclusively on more traditional response mea-
sures does not always reveal the true dynamics of information
processing as it unfolds over time. In this manner, movement tra-
jectories are proving valuable in examining the spatial component
of mental activity (Oliveri et al., 2009). The present data sug-
gest a rather specific time course for abstract concept activations
influencing movement trajectories.
In addition, mouse initiation times were not affected by spa-
tial primes, suggesting relatively delayed onset of abstract concept
priming effects on movement trajectories. It could be the case that
motor movement trajectories were altered through a cascading
activation mechanism that activates abstract conceptual content
which then, in turn, influences the comprehension of subsequent
content (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008). This type of effect would
be congruent with work demonstrating that the motor system is
activated approximately 200 ms following the presentation of a
body-relevant action word. In the present design, if primed con-
cepts are only beginning to activate the motor system by the time
our target words are presented (71 ms after the prime), behavior
becomes biased by the prime only after the onset of target-directed
movement.
The present results speak to strong relationships between the
ways in which we perceive and interact with our environment
on a daily basis and the ways in which we process and represent
abstract information. The idea that abstract concepts are bound
to experience is foundational to theories of embodied cognition
(Lakoff and Johnson, 1999; Barsalou, 2008), which posit that men-
tal representations of both concrete and abstract concepts often
reflect specific regularities in the way we perceive and interact
with those concepts in the world (cf., Miles et al., 2010a). Through
this theorized mechanism, people process abstract, intangible con-
cepts through real-world perceptions and actions. In many cases
this grounding mechanism facilitates deeper understanding of the
abstract (Barsalou, 1999). In the context of this experiment, cod-
ing abstract coordinate directions in concrete space may provide
a framework through which abstract spatial understanding can
more easily manifest. More specifically, thinking about coordinate
directions (e.g., west ) in terms of self-relevant space (e.g., to the
left ), may facilitate the construction of allocentric mental models
from egocentric experience. Interestingly, some languages such as
Guugu Yimithirr (northeastern Australia) encode directions using
world-centered reference systems; for instance, referring to sides
of the body as east and west dependent on the facing direction
of the individual (e.g., the bug is on your west arm; Brown and
Levinson, 1992, 1993; Haviland, 1996, 1998). To our knowledge, no
work has considered whether these individuals show any preferred
association between these directions and sides of their body, or if
they show relatively facilitated generation of allocentric models.
Several theoretical positions have been offered to account for
the types of results described presently. Conceptual metaphor
theory would suggest that image schemas of directly experienced
axes (up, down, left, right) are necessary to structure abstract
spatial concepts in order to facilitate understanding (Lakoff and
Johnson, 1980; Gibbs, 2003); under this theory, people form
image schemas to represent spatial relations, and this metaphori-
cal mapping is reflected in language (e.g., our relationship is headed
south.). A second position posits that understanding abstract lan-
guage recruits the motor system (Glenberg et al., 2008a,b); under
this theory, both concrete and abstract language that describe or
imply (respectively) directional motion are at least partially under-
stood through activation of the motor system. Perhaps the most
extreme position posits that perceptuo-motor representations are
not only involved but also necessary elements underlying the abil-
ity for humans to understand abstract concepts (Barsalou, 1999;
Barsalou and Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Somewhat more even-
handed treatments suggest that both linguistic and perceptuo-
motor representations influence the comprehension of abstract
concepts; for instance, while abstract thought might not necessi-
tate perceptual or motoric simulation, these processes might serve
to enrich linguistic representations and facilitate deeper under-
standing (Mahon and Caramazza, 2008; Dove, 2009; Pecher et al.,
2011).
We propose, congruent with some earlier claims regarding
metaphor processing (Murphy, 1996; Pecher et al., 2011), that
the abstract concept of coordinate direction likely has a learned
structure of its own, as do body-referenced concrete directions.
In other words, abstract coordinate direction can be understood
without association to concrete space, though this concrete asso-
ciation is frequently relied upon to structure understanding. This
may be particularly the case with individuals who find it difficult
to understand abstract spatial concepts, such as those with lower
spatial ability; future work might examine how spatial abilities
modulate propensities toward mapping abstract spatial concepts
to concrete space. Regardless of their precise source, however, even
though abstract-concrete associations (i.e., north-up) might aid
understanding in many situations, we propose that they might also
impair certain types of behavior. For instance, our recent work
suggests that implicit associations between abstract coordinates
and concrete vertical space lead people to misassociate the north-
ward direction with upward movement and thus greater physical
exertion (due to gravity; Brunyé et al., in press); because action
planning and perception involve assessments of predicted body
states and affordances, the associations revealed in the present
work might bias route planning and navigation decisions in unin-
tended manners, potentially leading to suboptimal spatial deci-
sions (Knoblich and Flach, 2001; Witt et al., 2004; Fajen, 2005;
Proffitt, 2006).
We introduced the present research as having three main goals
and hypotheses. First, we expected that people would associate
abstract coordinate terms (i.e., cardinal directions) with egocen-
tric body axes (up/down, left/right); response time data showed
some support for this claim, with slower response times when
participants were primed with a direction orthogonal to their
target movement direction. Second, we expected that movement
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trajectories would prove valuable in elucidating otherwise hid-
den cognitive operations; movement trajectory data showed
strong support for this claim, with reliable directionally specific
movement biases toward orthogonal primes. Finally, we set out
to examine the temporal dynamics of abstract concept activation
influences on motor movements; results showed strong evidence
for a temporally defined process by which abstract concepts alter
movement trajectories. Together, we provide the first demonstra-
tion that abstract spatial concept understanding is bound to con-
crete space and can manifest through the perceptuo-motor system.
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